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Abstract. This paper is concerned with a competitive or voting location problem on networks
under a proportional choice rule that has previously been introduced by Bauer et al. (1993).
We refine a discretization result of the authors by proving convexity and concavity properties
of related expected payoff functions. Furthermore, we answer the long time open question
whether 1-suboptimal points are always vertices by providing a counterexample on a tree
network.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Voting location problems are concerned with locating resources in some given space
as the result of a collective election. They therefore incorporate the fact that the
location sites themselves influence the utility drawn from the resources by the voters.
Think, for example, of the problem of locating a school in a city and suppose that
every individual wishes to have the facility as close as possible to its place of residence
because the benefit enjoyed by the individual is a decreasing function of the distance
traveled. The council of the city of Birmingham in the United Kingdom, for instance,
wishes to find “placements that best meet the needs of children and young people
and the aspirations of parents and carers, as close as possible to where they live”
(Birmingham Council, 2011). We are faced with the problem of finding a compromise
within the group of residents.
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Voting location problems are closely related to competitive location models, dat-
ing back to Hotelling (1929). Here we are concerned with the location of resources
in space as well, but, rather than incorporating an explicit election process, location
decisions are being made by independent decision-makers who will subsequently com-
pete with each other, e.g. for market share when we think of locating facilities such
as gas stations or supermarkets. Sequential locational competition is characterized by
two types of players: leaders, who choose locations at given instants, anticipating the
subsequent actions of later entrants, and followers, who make their location decisions
based on the past decisions of the leaders. Even though the users in a voting location
problem find compromises in order to locate resources that can be interpreted to be
owned by a single decision maker, the voting process is such that a stable location
is generally characterized by the nonexistence of a strong party of users who prefer
alternative locations, that may be seen as possible locations of a competitive decision
maker. Thus, although the focus of voting location problems is somewhat different,
they may be interpreted as a special case of sequential competitive location prob-
lems. There is a strategic element that these problems share (Hansen et al., 1990):
independent decision makers influence the solution by making their decisions.
There are several kinds of compromises, i.e. rules for evaluating a voting process,
that one may consider. Furthermore, in a mathematical model, one may consider
different representations of the location space, e.g. networks or d-dimensional real
spaces. A detailed overview of these and other classification criteria is given by Kress
and Pesch (2012) and in the references therein. A well known concept for defining
compromises is the Condorcet point (Hansen and Thisse, 1981). Here we are seeking
point sets C of the location space such that no strict majority of voters prefers another
point to any element of C. If the location space under consideration is represented by
a network and the voters are located in the vertices of this network, it is well known
that the existence of Condorcet points depends on the structure of the network and
the distribution of the voters (see, for instance, Bandelt, 1985; Hansen and Thisse,
1981; Hansen et al., 1986; Labbe´, 1985). The potential nonexistence of Condorcet
points in general networks led to the incorporation of a minimax objective in the
literature, i.e. the search for points such that the maximal number of voters who
prefer another point is minimal. An optimal solution to this optimization problem is
called a Simpson point (Bandelt, 1985; Hansen and Labbe´, 1988; Simpson, 1969).
The behavior of voters needs to be modeled by some kind of a choice rule in
any voting location problem. Given a choice set, a choice rule is said to be binary,
if it models a deterministic behavior of voters where each voter chooses exactly one
(known) alternative. Under a proportional choice rule, the researcher can only derive
probabilities of voting behavior. While the Condorcet and Simpson concepts make
use of binary choice rules, Bauer et al. (1993) generalize these point sets to what they
call k-optimal and k-suboptimal points (k ∈ N∪ {∞} being a parameter for customer
loyalty) by defining a proportional choice rule to model voting processes on networks
(cf. also Hakimi, 1986, 1990, for discretization results on a follower location problem
with multiple facilities under proportional choice). The paper at hand makes two
contributions to the latter point sets. First, we refine a discretization property of Bauer
et al. (1993) by proving convexity and concavity properties of related expected payoff
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functions. Second, we answer the long time open question whether 1-suboptimal points
are always vertices by providing a counterexample on a tree network. Additionally,
we provide questions for future research.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We first present graph the-
oretic fundamentals and some basic definitions in Section 2 in order to be able to
define the proportional choice rule in Section 3. The main results of our research are
presented in Section 4 and are complemented by examples and counterexamples in
Section 5. The paper closes with a conclusion and remarks on future research in Sec-
tion 6. Due to the close relationship of voting location and competitive location, we
will use the terms user, customer and voter, facility and resource, as well as the terms
number of voters and demand interchangeably throughout the paper.
2. NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS
In this section we will give some definitions and introduce the basic notation used
throughout this paper. Some of the definitions are taken from Bauer et al. (1993) (cf.
also Bandelt, 1985). We assume the reader to be familiar with the basic concepts of
graph theory (see, for example, Gross and Yellen, 2004; Swamy and Thulasiraman,
1981).
We will denote a network by N = (V,E, λ), with V (|V | = n) being the (finite)
vertex set and E (|E| = m) being the (finite) edge set of the underlying graph. The
mapping λ : E → R+ defines the lengths of the network’s edges. An edge e ∈ E
joining two vertices u and v is denoted by e = [u, v]. We assume that the networks
considered in this paper are undirected, connected and that there are no multiple
edges. Moreover, we assume that there are no loops at the vertices. We define the
points x of a network N (x ∈ N) to be the elements of the edges (including all
vertices) and denote the length of a shortest path (distance) connecting two points x
and y of a network by d(x, y). A subedge [x, y] (or xy) of an edge e ∈ E is determined
by two points x and y on e (x, y ∈ e). The length of a subedge [x, y] is denoted
by λ([x, y]) = λ(xy). A subedge defined by all points of an edge [u, v] ∈ E without
including the vertices u and v is denoted by (u, v). We associate a (local) coordinate
xuv ∈ [0, λ(uv)] with every edge [u, v] ∈ E of a network N . Thus, we are able to define
any point of the network. The direction of counting can be defined arbitrarily. The set
of all points x on shortest paths between two vertices u and v of a network N is called
the interval I(u, v) between u and v, i.e. I(u, v) = {x ∈ N |d(u, v) = d(u, x)+d(x, v)}.1
The interval is ported if for any pair of points x ∈ I(u, v) and y /∈ I(u, v) every shortest
path from x to y passes through u or v.
Given a network N , we will assume that there is a finite number of users located
at the vertices of N . At each vertex there may be several users or none at all. Their
number is described by a weight function pi : V → R+0 . We define pi(x) := 0 for all
x /∈ V . pi may not be equal to the zero function. For a subnetwork N ′ of N we denote
by pi(V ′) the sum
∑
u∈V ′ pi(u) where V
′ is the vertex set of N ′.
1 Note that we denote open intervals of real space by (a, b), a, b ∈ R, a ¬ b. Similarly, closed intervals
of real space are denoted by [a, b], a, b ∈ R, a ¬ b.
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Let N = (V,E, λ) be a finite network. Furthermore, let [u, v] ∈ E be any edge
and i ∈ N , i /∈ (u, v) be a point of the network (see Figure 1(a)).
u v
i
λ(uv)
d(i
, u
)
d(i, v)
xuv
(a) Edge and point.
bpiuv λ(uv)
d(i, v)
d(i, u)
dˆv(i, xuv)
dˆu(i, xuv)
d(i, xuv)
xuv
λ(uv)
λ(uv)
(b) Graphical interpretation.
Fig. 1. Bottleneck points.
Define dˆu(i, xuv) (and dˆv(i, xuv)) to be the length of the – not necessarily shortest
– path from a point xuv ∈ [0, λ(uv)] to i via vertex u (or v) using the shortest path from
u (or v) to i, that is dˆu(i, xuv) := d(i, u)+xuv (and dˆv(i, xuv) := d(i, v)+λ(uv)−xuv).
If there exists a point xuv = bpiuv ∈ (0, λ(uv)) such that dˆu(i, bpiuv) = dˆv(i, bpiuv), then
bpiuv = 0.5(d(i, v)+λ(uv)−d(i, u)) (see Figure 1(b)). Such a point is generally referred
to as a bottleneck point of the edge [u, v] with respect to point i and defines the most
remote point from i on edge [u, v] (cf. also Hakimi, 1964; Hooker et al., 1991). If
d(i, u) = d(i, v) + λ(uv) or d(i, v) = d(i, u) + λ(uv), the bottleneck point is defined to
be one of the vertices u or v, i.e.
bpiuv :=
{
0 if d(i, u) = d(i, v) + λ(uv),
λ(uv) if d(i, v) = d(i, u) + λ(uv).
(1)
We get
d(i, xuv) =
{
d(i, u) + xuv if 0 ¬ xuv ¬ bpiuv,
d(i, v) + λ(uv)− xuv if bpiuv < xuv ¬ λ(uv).
(2)
Now observe that, given an arbitrary edge [u, v] ∈ E and any vertex ui ∈ V of
the network, the function d(ui, xuv) is continuous in the variable xuv on the interval
[0, λ(uv)]. This is easily seen from (2), since an increase of a given xuv by an arbitrarily
small  > 0 (with xuv +  ¬ λ(uv)) can change the distance d(ui, xuv) by at most .
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3. A PROPORTIONAL CHOICE RULE
Bauer et al. (1993) consider proportional choice in the context of a single facility
voting location problem. The facility to be located in this problem corresponds to
a leader’s facility in the corresponding (two player) sequential competitive location
problem. In order to make the distinction of leader and follower more intuitive, we
will refine the notion and definitions of Bauer et al. (1993). This induces the need to
revisit some of their propositions and theorems.
Let N = (V,E, λ), V = {u1, ..., un}, be a (finite) network and let x ∈ N be the
leader’s location and y ∈ N the follower’s location, respectively. We assume that the
customers are homogenous in the sense that each of them demands exactly one unit
of a (homogenous) commodity offered by the players. Then we define
EkL(x, y) :=

n∑
i=1
pi(ui) · d(ui, y)
k
d(ui, y)k + d(ui, x)k
if x 6= y,
1
2 (pi(V ) + pi(x)) if x = y,
(3)
to be the expected number of customers visiting the leader’s facility (index L) for
any given k ∈ N ∪ {∞}.2 k may be interpreted as a parameter for customer loyalty,
since a very large k models the deterministic (binary) behavior of the customers in
the Condorcet model (cf. Bauer et al. (1993)). Similarly, the expected number of
customers accommodating their demand at the follower’s (index F ) facility is defined
to be
EkF (x, y) :=

n∑
i=1
pi(ui) · d(ui, x)
k
d(ui, x)k + d(ui, y)k
if x 6= y,
1
2 (pi(V )− pi(x)) if x = y.
(4)
It is easy to see that we have EkL(x, y) +E
k
F (x, y) = pi(N). Note that, if the follower’s
facility y is established at the same site as the leader’s facility x, ties are broken
such that all customers v ∈ V \ {x} (are expected to) accommodate half of their
demand at each of the facilities, while the customers located at x (are expected to)
visit the leader’s facility only. This assumption is designed to avoid trivial solutions
(similar to Hakimi, 1990) and to guarantee continuity of the expected value functions
(Proposition 3.1, cf. Bauer et al., 1993). However, it can also be motivated from a
practical point of view by interpreting it as enforcing a kind of local first mover
advantage. That is, the leader may have superior information on the local market
that can, for instance, be utilized for effective sales promotion.
Proposition 3.1.
Let N be a (finite) network. The expected values EkL(x, y) and E
k
F (x, y) are
continuous functions in y on N . Furthermore, assuming y /∈ V , they are
continuous in x on N .
2 Note that Ekq (x, y), q ∈ {L,F}, does not refer to the edge set E of the underlying network and
that k is an index with respect to Ekq (x, y), while it is an exponent of the distances. Furthermore,
note that we drop the index k when k = 1 in the remainder of the paper.
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Proof. The proof is an immediate consequence of Propositions 1 and 2 of Bauer et al.
(1993).
Observe that, given some y ∈ V with pi(y) > 0, EkL(x, y) and EkF (x, y) have
exactly one discontinuity at x = y. It is easy to see that this is a result of the tie
breaking rule given above.
In analogy to the Condorcet and Simpson concepts we define:
Definition 3.1 (Bauer et al. (1993)).
Let N be a (finite) network. Given two points x, y ∈ N , the value EkF (x, y)/
pi(N) is the relative k-rejection of point x at point y. The maximal relative
k-rejection of a point x ∈ N is the value
ρk(x) := max
y∈N
EkF (x, y)
pi(N)
.
Definition 3.2 (Bauer et al. (1993)).
Let N be a (finite) network. A point x ∈ N is called k-optimal if
EkL(x, y) ­
1
2
pi(N)
for all y ∈ N . A point x ∈ N is called k-suboptimal if
ρk(x) = min
z∈N
ρk(z).
4. 1-SUBOPTIMAL POINTS
The following convexity property will prove useful in the sequel.
Proposition 4.1.
Let N be a (finite) network and xˆ ∈ V be a fixed leader’s location. The
expected values EF (xˆ, xuv) are convex functions in the variable xuv on I =
[0, λ(uv)] for all [u, v] ∈ E.
Proof. Given pi(ui) ­ 0 and Proposition 3.1, it is sufficient to show that the functions
eui,F (xˆ, xuv) :=
d(ui, xˆ)
d(ui, xˆ) + d(ui, xuv)
are convex in xuv on the open interval I¯ = (0, λ(uv)) for all xˆ, ui ∈ V and [u, v] ∈ E.
It is easy to see that the functions eui,F (xˆ, xuv) are convex (and non-increasing) in
the (non-negative) distance d(ui, xuv) (a formal proof can be found in Hakimi, 1986).
Now, given the previously derived continuity observation and the fact that d(ui, xuv)
is the minimum of two linear functions in xuv as shown in Figure 1(b), the assertion
follows immediately.
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Similarly we find:
Proposition 4.2.
Let N be a (finite) network and yˆ ∈ V be a fixed follower’s location. The
expected values EF (xuv, yˆ) are concave functions in the variable xuv on I =
[0, λ(uv)] for all [u, v] ∈ E.
Proof. The proof is in analogy to the proof of Proposition 4.1.
As a consequence of Proposition 4.1 and Theorem 5 of Bauer et al. (1993) we
may conclude:3
Proposition 4.3.
Let N be a network with vertex weight function pi : V → R+0 and at least
two positive vertex weights. Let I(u, v) be a ported interval of N where
pi(I(u, v)) = pi({u, v}) and let y be any point of this interval where u 6= y 6= v.
Then EF (x, u) > EF (x, y) or EF (x, v) > EF (x, y) for all x ∈ N .
Thus, the maximal relative 1-rejection of any point of the network is always
reached at a vertex.
Definition 4.1.
Let N be a (finite) network and k = 1. We say R is the upper envelope of rejection,
if R(xuv) = max
w∈V
EF (xuv, w) for any xuv ∈ [0, λ(uv)] and for all [u, v] ∈ E.
Given Proposition 4.3 and Proposition 4.2, it is easy to see that any 1-suboptimal
point is at a vertex of the network N or at a point x ∈ N where “rejection func-
tions” that define the upper envelope of rejection intersect, i.e. where EF (x,w1) =
EF (x,w2) = R(x), w1, w2 ∈ V , w1 6= w2. Making use of this discretization property,
Bauer et al. (1993) design an algorithm of time complexity O(n5) to determine all
suboptimal points of a given network. It remained open if 1-suboptimal points are
even always vertices. An example answers this long time open question for the case
of tree networks. Consider the network of Figure 2 with all edge lengths equal to one
and vertex weights pi(v) ∈ {0, 1} for all v ∈ V , the latter being indicated by numbers
next to the vertices.
1
0
4
0
6
1
3
1
5
1
2
0
7
0
10
1
8
1
9
1
x12
Fig. 2. Tree network.
Table 1 lists the relative rejection of vertex i ∈ V (leader’s location) at vertex
j (follower’s location) in cell (i, j), when considering the example network. Thus,
when restricting the set of potential locations to the vertex set, the maximal relative
rejection is minimal at vertices 1 and 2. We denote this level of rejection by ρ0.
3 Note that, in their proof of Theorem 5 under the assumptions stated in Proposition 4.3, Bauer et al.
(1993) essentially only show that EF (x, u) > EF (x, y) or EF (x, v) > EF (x, y) for all x ∈ N \{u, v}
(not for all x ∈ N). Proposition 4.1 fixes this inaccuracy.
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Table 1. Relative rejection of vertices.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 0.5 0.5 0.472 0.487 0.472 0.5095 0.486 0.462 0.462 0.486
2 0.5 0.5 0.462 0.487 0.462 0.486 0.487 0.472 0.472 0.5095
3 0.528 0.538 0.417 0.492 0.5 0.514 0.528 0.5 0.5 0.514
4 0.513 0.514 0.508 0.5 0.508 0.5 0.5 0.472 0.472 0.49
5 0.528 0.538 0.5 0.492 0.417 0.514 0.528 0.5 0.5 0.514
6 0.49 0.514 0.486 0.5 0.486 0.417 0.5095 0.486 0.486 0.5
7 0.514 0.513 0.472 0.5 0.472 0.49 0.5 0.508 0.508 0.5
8 0.538 0.528 0.5 0.528 0.5 0.514 0.492 0.417 0.5 0.514
9 0.538 0.528 0.5 0.528 0.5 0.514 0.492 0.5 0.417 0.514
10 0.514 0.49 0.486 0.5095 0.486 0.5 0.5 0.486 0.486 0.417
Figure 3 takes a closer look at edge [1, 2] and corresponding rejection functions
EF (x12, w), w ∈ V . Note that, for the sake of clarity, only the subset of functions that
define the upper envelope of rejection is depicted. We find that every point on edge
[1, 2] has a maximal relative rejection level smaller than or equal to ρ0. As a direct
consequence we may conclude that there exists no 1-suboptimal point at a vertex of
the network. Furthermore, when analyzing the remaining edges of the network, we
find two points on edge [1, 2], so1 and so2, to be 1-suboptimal.
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
2.92
2.96
3
3.04
EF(x12,1) EF(x12,2)
EF(x12,10) EF(x12,6)
ρ0 · π(N)
x12so1 so2
Fig. 3. Rejection functions and suboptimal points.
We close this section by providing a vertex optimality property for the family of
connected networks with two vertices only.
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Proposition 4.4.
Let N = (V,E, λ), V = {u, v}, E = {[u, v]} be a network with vertex weight
function pi and at least one positive vertex weight. Then ρk(u) < ρk(xuv) or
ρk(v) < ρk(xuv) for all xuv 6= 0 and xuv 6= λ(uv).
Proof. It is easy to see that ρk(u) = pi(v)pi(N) and ρ
k(v) = pi(u)pi(N) . Therefore,
– if pi(u) = pi(v), we have ρk(u) = ρk(v) = 0.5,
– if pi(u) > pi(v), we have ρk(u) < 0.5,
– if pi(u) < pi(v), we have ρk(v) < 0.5.
Thus, there always exists a k-optimal point, which, in combination with Theorem 6
of Bauer et al. (1993), i.e. the fact that k-optimal points are always vertices, proves
the assertion.
5. EXAMPLES AND COUNTEREXAMPLES
When analyzing the example of Figure 2 in Section 4, the reader may have had several
ideas on varying the network to achieve the vertex optimality property or simplify-
ing the network without enforcing vertex optimality. This section aims at providing
counterexamples on some of these potential ideas that may also raise questions for
future research.
First, we show that the vertex optimality property may not hold even when
pi(v) > 0 for all v ∈ V . To this end, we augment the example network by introducing
a sufficiently small constant  > 0 and adding this constant to all zero vertex weights
(see Figure 4, where 1 = 2 = ). The relevant rejection functions for  = 0.02
are depicted in Figure 5(a) (all elements are in analogy to Figure 3). It is easy to
see that the vertex optimality property does not hold. For future research, one may
analyze how small the differences in vertex weights in general networks can get without
enforcing vertex optimality.
1
1
4
1
6
1
3
1
5
1
2
1
7
2
10
1
8
1
9
1
x12
Fig. 4. No vertex weight equals zero.
We may conclude from the former example that there exist networks N =
(V,E, λ) that do not possess the vertex optimality property, even if pi : V → N,
i.e. pi(v) > 0 and integer for all v ∈ V . To see this, suppose that all edge lengths
and vertex weights of a network N = (V,E, λ) are rational numbers. Represent those
numbers as fractions of two integers and define c to be the least common multiple of
their denominators. Then we can transform N into a network N ′ = (V,E, λ′) with
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 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
EF(x12,1) EF(x12,2)
EF(x12,10) EF(x12,6)
ρ0 · π(N)
x12so1 so2
2.96
3
3.04
3.08
(a) 1 = 2 =  = 0.02.
 0  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
EF(x12,1) EF(x12,2)
EF(x12,10) EF(x12,6)
ρ0 · π(N)
x12so 0.2
2.94
2.98
3.02
3.06
(b) 1 = 0.02, 2 = 0.01
Fig. 5. Rejection functions and suboptimal points.
λ′(uv) = cλ(uv) for all [u, v] ∈ E and pi′(u) = cpi(u) for all u ∈ V without chang-
ing the ratio of the (expected) market shares of leader and follower for any feasible
location setting.
Next, one may wonder if the symmetry of the example network plays a crucial
role. Thus, we break the symmetry by setting 1 = 0.02 6= 2 = 0.01 in the network
of Figure 4. This results in the rejection functions shown in Figure 5(b). Again, the
vertex optimality property does not hold.
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We say that two neighbored vertices v1, v2 ∈ V of a network N = (V,E, λ) are
being merged, if the corresponding edge length λ(v1, v2) is reduced to zero, which is
equivalent to introducing a new vertex vv1,v2 with pi(vv1,v2) = pi(v1) + pi(v2) in the
place of vertices v1 and v2 and edge [v1, v2]. Table 2 lists merging operations that
the reader may have thought of in order to simplify the example network of Figure 2
without inducing vertex optimality. Observe that a 1-optimal point exists in all of
the resulting networks, and thus any 1-suboptimal point is a vertex (cf. Theorem 6 of
Bauer et al. (1993)).
Table 2. Merging vertices.
merge vertices 3,5 3,5 and 8,9 3,4 3,4 and 7,9
1-optimal points v3,5 v3,5 and v8,9 v3,4 v3,4 and v7,9
merge vertices 6,1 6,1 and 2,10 3,5 and 7,9 3,5 and 2,10
1-optimal points v6,1 v6,1 and v2,10 v3,5 and v7,9 v3,5
merge vertices 3,4 and 2,10 3,5 and 6,1 3,5; 6,1; 2,10 and 8,9
1-optimal points v2,10 v3,5 v6,1 and v2,10
In analogy to Table 2, Table 3 refers to deleting vertices and their incident edges in
the example network. Again, a 1-optimal point exists in all of the resulting networks.
Table 3. Deleting vertices.
delete vertices 3 6 3,5 3,6 3,8 3,10 6,10 3,5,8
1-optimal points 10 10 8,9 8,9 6,10 8,9 3,5,8,9 10
delete vertices 3,5,10 3,6,8 3,6,10 3,5,8,9 3,5,8,10 3,6,8,10
1-optimal points 8,9 10 8,9 6,10 6,9 5,9
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This paper has been concerned with voting location problems under a proportional
choice rule, introduced by Bauer et al. (1993). We have refined a known discretiza-
tion property in Proposition 4.3 by proving convexity and concavity properties of
related expected payoff functions in Propositions 4.1 and 4.2. Moreover, we have an-
swered the long time open question whether 1-suboptimal points are always vertices
by providing a counterexample on a tree network in Section 4. Additionally, a dis-
cretization property for the family of connected networks with two vertices only has
been derived in Proposition 4.4. This property raises an interesting question for fu-
ture research: Does the vertex optimality property carry over to the more complex
family of chain networks N = (V,E, λ) with vertex set V = {u1, ..., un} and edge set
E = {[ui, ui+1]|i = 1, ..., n− 1} for k = 1?
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